Unintended Consequences
The United States at War
Ian J. Bickerton, Kenneth J. HaganIn Unintended Consequences Ian J. Bickerton and Kenneth J. Hagan describe and analyse the unintended consequences of ten major wars fought by the United States, pointing out critical turning points in the conflicts and the remarkable similarity of dilemmas that followed the conclusion of hostilities. The effect is to demonstrate that the unintended consequences of the wars not only outweighed the intended consequences in shaping subsequent events, they produced sharp and significant shifts in United States foreign, military and domestic policy. Most wars embarked upon by the United States when measured against this criterion were not only catastrophic and destructive, they were avoidable, unnecessary and unpredictable in outcome.
Once they understand this reality, Americans concerned with contemporary foreign and military policy can approach Iraq, and any prospective conflict, with greater sophistication. More importantly, policy-makers thinking of undertaking wars in the future may be made more cautious and circumspect in their planning than were those who launched the war in Iraq. It will also prove to be an invaluable corrective to the traditional views of American wars to which we are routinely exposed.
In Unintended Consequences Ian J. Bickerton and Kenneth J. Hagan describe and analyse the unintended consequences of ten major wars fought by the United States, pointing out critical turning points in the conflicts and the remarkable similarity of dilemmas that followed the conclusion of hostilities. The effect is to demonstrate that the unintended consequences of the wars not only outweighed the intended consequences in shaping subsequent events, they produced sharp and significant shifts in United States foreign, military and domestic policy. Most wars embarked upon by the United States when measured against this criterion were not only catastrophic and destructive, they were avoidable, unnecessary and unpredictable in outcome.
Once they understand this reality, Americans concerned with contemporary foreign and military policy can approach Iraq, and any prospective conflict, with greater sophistication. More importantly, policy-makers thinking of undertaking wars in the future may be made more cautious and circumspect in their planning than were those who launched the war in Iraq. It will also prove to be an invaluable corrective to the traditional views of American wars to which we are routinely exposed.
In Unintended Consequences Ian J. Bickerton and Kenneth J. Hagan describe and analyse the unintended consequences of ten major wars fought by the United States, pointing out critical turning points in the conflicts and the remarkable similarity of dilemmas that followed the conclusion of hostilities. The effect is to demonstrate that the unintended consequences of the wars not only outweighed the intended consequences in shaping subsequent events, they produced sharp and significant shifts in United States foreign, military and domestic policy. Most wars embarked upon by the United States when measured against this criterion were not only catastrophic and destructive, they were avoidable, unnecessary and unpredictable in outcome.
Once they understand this reality, Americans concerned with contemporary foreign and military policy can approach Iraq, and any prospective conflict, with greater sophistication. More importantly, policy-makers thinking of undertaking wars in the future may be made more cautious and circumspect in their planning than were those who launched the war in Iraq. It will also prove to be an invaluable corrective to the traditional views of American wars to which we are routinely exposed.
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Kenneth Hagan is Professor of Strategy at the United States Naval War College. When he argues forcefully that the vast majority of wars launched by the United States were unnecessary, avoidable and catastrophically unpredictable, you take note. Hagan is an angry man, spurred by the Iraq War to write this book.
'Diplomatmagazine
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For many politicians and theorists the Carl von Clausewitz nostrum that war is merely the continuation of policy by other means has become a bleak orthodoxy. In this engrossing book, Kenneth J. Hagan and Ian J. Bickerton demonstrate that Clausewitzs nostrum is little more than glib nonsense.
'Sydney Morning Herald
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There is little to argue with in this take on history, and the fresh point of view does give certain insights. The two authors also tell their tale well and keep the reader turning pages.'
'Australian Financial Review
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What this book so succinctly points out is that Americas involvement in wars – from the War of Independence through to Iraq (and the authors reject the whole idea of the War on Terror as a war) – has always produced the unintended consequences of the title. Their analysis of World War II, for example, brilliantly points out the unintended result of how President Truman used the atom bomb that it effectively started the Cold War.
'The Age
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Unintended Consequencesis a concise history offered as a cautionary tale for those who would rush to arms in order to solve unpleasant problems . . . essential reading for national decision-makers and professional military education courses. It is also a very good book for the general reader, being clear, concise, well-written and including good notes and a comprehensive bibliography.
'Defender
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The short account given of each of the 10 wars is a very readable brush-up on American history the consequences of each, especially the Civil War, is salutary the extension of the argument to the Iraq war is inevitable and convincing.
'Newcastle Herald, Australia
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Mincing no words, these accomplished historians, one Australian and one American, plumb the past, from the American Revolution through Iraq, keenly demonstrating that US wars have produced unintended, often negative, outcomes. US leaders' exaggeration of threats, their ignorance of local conditions, and their flawed assumptions that political victory can be achieved through military force have led to unforeseen, unwanted consequences. Clausewitz got it wrong: war is not a continuation of policy but rather a radical alteration of policy. Sharply departing from the traditional way of thinking about US wars, Bickerton and Hagan challenge us to understand that war has raised more problems than it has solved.
'Thomas G. Paterson, University of Connecticut, author ofContesting Castro(1994) and former President of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
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In a world where the threat is no longer likely to be an easily identifiable nation state, conventional military responses are perhaps no longer appropriate. Not only does [this book] prove that the unintended consequences may outweigh the reason for the action in the first instance, but, in the contemporary world, results are likely to be even further divorced from those originally anticipated. It is just what is needed in today's world – historians who are prepared to stir the hornets nest!
'Lt Cdr T.T.A. Lovering, MBE RN, editor ofAmphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea(2005)
Preface
Introduction
1. The First Major War, 1775-83
2. The Second War against Great Britain, 1912-15
3. The War against Mexico, 1846-48
4. The Civil War, 1861-65
5. The War against Spain, 1898
6. The United States in World War I, 1917-18
7. The United States in World War II, 1941-45
8. The War in Korea, 1950-53
9. The War in Vietnam, 1964-75
10. The Wars against Iraq, 1991-2007
Conclusion
References
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Index
Ian J. Bickerton (Author)
Ian J. Bickerton is Associate Professor of History at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. He is the author of many books, including Unintended Consequences: The United States at War (2007), published by Reaktion. And The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History (Reaktion, 2009).
Kenneth J. Hagan (Author)
Kenneth J. Hagan is Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College, Monterey, California, and co-author of American Foreign Relations: A History (6th edn, 2004).